Greece, SYRIZA in Power,
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[Note: In this piece I use a term I have, generally, banished from my
personal vocabulary for the 21st century: “dictatorship of the proletariat.” I
do so because we are confronted with the challenge of understanding a text from
1922, in which that term appears. The document in question is cited by Alan
Thornett (and others, I might add) in defense of a specific theoretical approach
toward recent events in Greece. Though Thornett does not quote that part of the
Comintern’s document where it refers to the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” I
will, because it is a key portion if we want to comprehend the question that was
actually being addressed. I ask readers to keep in mind that in 1922 the term
“dictatorship of the proletariat” meant, simply, a revolutionary state based on
democratic working-class power. It was conceived as a “dictatorship” of the
working class as a whole, over the capitalist class as a whole, not a
dictatorship of some individual, or “vanguard party” over society. This latter
conception is a meaning of “communist dictatorship” which was inconceivable
before Stalin consolidated his personal totalitarian rule in the USSR beginning
in the mid 1920s.]
International Viewpoint has published a compilation of articles on Greece
and the failure of SYRIZA
(http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?breve143). In the present
comment I want to deal mainly with the contribution by Alan Thornett, titled
“The capitulation of Tsipras leadership and the role of ‘left europeanism’”
(http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4217). We will look, in
particular, at Thornett’s assertion that the SYRIZA government was, at least
potentially, an example of a “workers’ government”—as that concept was developed
by the Comintern in a set of theses adopted at its third congress in 1922. I
will assert that Thornett’s approach reflects both a misunderstanding of the
Comintern’s text and a disorientation regarding the SYRIZA government itself.
Let’s start our investigation, however, with a quote from a different
article that IV includes in the same collection, the one by Catarina Príncipe
and Dan Russell titled “Asking the Right Questions”
(http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4220). Príncipe and
Russell directly express the same disorientation as Thornett regarding the tasks
of revolutionaries in Greece in 2015: “Those of us who don’t have to confront
the question of state power just yet nonetheless must learn the right lessons
both from SYRIZA and the history from which it was born.”
I would say, however, that we cannot even begin to “ask the right
questions,” let alone “learn the right lessons,” until we realize that starting
in January 2015, immediately after winning the election, the key confrontation
that SYRIZA had to engage was, precisely, with “the question of state
power”—specifically with the nature and limitations of the governmental power
that had come into its hands, and therefore with the need to construct an
alternative power based on a mobilized mass movement in order to fulfill the
campaign promises that Tsipras had made to the people of Greece.
In a sense, of course, “the question of state power” is one that
revolutionaries confront at all times in one way or another, even in activities
like a strike, or a campaign to free political prisoners. But I will insist that
SYRIZA faced this question immediately and acutely, as soon as the election
results became known in Greece last January.
A collective error
All of the contributions compiled by the IV editors follow a consistent
pattern of thought, reflecting this same general disorientation: What went wrong
in Greece, we are told, is that Alexis Tsipras failed to pursue the right
governmental policies after the January 2015 election. I disagree, though it is
true that Tsipras failed to pursue the right policies.
What went wrong in Greece was, instead, that both Tsipras and the left
opposition within SYRIZA approached their tasks as if the governmental power
that came into Tsipras’s hands in January was the key and decisive tool to wage
an anti-austerity struggle against the EU, disagreeing merely about what
specific administrative steps the government itself should or should not take.
Both Tsipras and his critics within SYRIZA failed to engage the reality just
identified: that as soon as a governmental coalition was created in January,
SYRIZA then had to “confront the question of state power” in a very real and
immediate sense.
The governmental power that came into Tsipras’s hands was at best only a
blunt instrument. The real hope was to develop a struggle which could transcend
and overwhelm the limitations imposed on any government by the realities of the
Greek bourgeois state and its relationship to the European Union. The importance
of mass mobilization gets honorable mention in the contributions compiled by IV.
But it is, clearly, conceived in these articles as a supplement to the actions
that Tsipras might have taken as head of state. A proper conception of tasks,
however, would be the reverse.
Although I disagree with the rejection by OKDE-Spartakos (Greek section of
the Fourth International) of an electoral bloc between ANTARSYA and Popular
Unity in September, their statement explaining this rejection
(http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4209) does in fact nail
the political essence of the problem by pointing out “what led to the total
devotion of SYRIZA to the memoranda and the euro: governmentalism, management
and reform of the state.”
And this observation by OKDE leads directly to our discussion about Alan
Thornett’s conception, or misconception, of a “workers’ government.” Thornett
writes as if the Communist International, in 1922, was approaching things from
the same vantage point as Príncipe and Russell in 2015: elaborating a process
whereby such a government might take office through electoral means and then use
its position as a tool to advance the interests of the masses without directly
“confront[ing] the question of state power.” But “governmentalism, management
and reform of the state” was not the agenda of the Third International. The
Comintern was, actually, focused on a completely different question: How to
seize control of the government and then use that control as a tool to actively
“confront the bourgeois state” itself, with the goal of overthrowing bourgeois
power and replacing it with a different kind of state power.
Thornett writes:
Not quite. This did not happen because the government that was elected in
January attempted to maneuver within the agreed-upon confines of bourgeois power
relations, rather than to create and then rely on alternative institutions of
power. Alexis Tsipras, holding as tightly as anyone might have hoped to his
anti-austerity agenda, could not have acted in the way Thornett proposes without
consciously and actively promoting the development of an alternative state power
in Greece, at least in embryo. There was no possibility for the anti-austerity
struggle to gain ground without a self-organized mass movement from below, one
that would begin to pose a threat to the bourgeois state itself. This, and only
this, could have forced genuine concessions from the EU.
The Tsipras government consciously chose a different path, however, a path
of negotiations at the top that turned the masses into passive bystanders.
Although there is a feedback loop of cause and effect at work here, I would tend
to say that the chain starts at a point which is the opposite of the one
Thornett identifies. Tsipras did not fail to create a workers’ government
because he abandoned his commitment to the struggle against austerity. He
abandoned the struggle against austerity because there was no other choice if he
conceived of his task as “governmentalism, management and reform of the
state”—that is, if he could not conceive of creating a genuine workers’
government.
Thornett continues:
This is not bad so far as it goes. But it stops short of the question that
was actually at the heart of the theoretical work being done by the Communist
International in 1922. The Third international did not conceive of a “workers’
government” coming to power and then, through the administrative process of that
government, advancing the interests of the masses without overthrowing
capitalism. It was, instead, interested in a different process: how to move from
a workers’ government of this type, if it ever does come to power, to a genuine
revolutionary government based on a revolutionary state. Thornett’s description
ends with the formation of the “transitional government.” For the Comintern,
however, that is where the most interesting and crucial work begins. It
developed the document we are considering for the sole purpose of thinking
through how communists might use the “workers’ government” in order to promote a
genuine transition to a communist dictatorship.
The perspective of the Comintern
Thornett quotes the Communist International theses as they describe the
reality in question. But he fails to make a distinction that is crucial if our
goal is to understand what the words he cites were actually trying to say:
Note that these two paragraphs from the Comintern text are talking about
two different things. The first (the one that does, indeed, sound like the Greek
situation in 2015) is merely considering the question of slogans. The second,
however, is describing a “workers’ government” not as a slogan, though it does
refer to the slogan in its last sentence, but as an actual government that might
come to power because communists raise this slogan. It is striking that the
reality described in the second paragraph is not at all like Greece in 2015.
There was no “workers’ government . . . pursu[ing] revolutionary policies,” and
no “bitter struggle with the bourgeoisie”—unless someone believes that the
negotiations between Tsipras and the EU can properly be characterized in that
way. We had only the potential/acute need for such a struggle. There was
certainly not a “possible civil war.” The mass actions that might have pushed
things in that direction had already receded.
The SYRIZA government arose “from a parliamentary combination,” but it did
not “provide the occasion for a revival of the revolutionary workers’ movement.”
Quite the opposite occurred, in fact. The masses in Greece, after the January
election, chose for the most part to simply await results that the government
promised to bring about without a struggle, through a process of
negotiation.
If Thornett had said, simply, that the conditions in Greece were consistent
with raising the slogan, or idea, of a “workers’ government” that would have
been true enough, and in keeping with the thinking of the Comintern. But when he
asserts that the same two words can be used as a descriptive characterization
for the actual government that was formed by Tsipras and SYRIZA—even as a
potential for what the SYRIZA government might have been—he and the Third
International have parted ways. The institutions of mass struggle that a
“workers’ government” of this type requires simply were not present. Neither
Tsipras nor any wing of SYRIZA had the perspective of working for their
development as their primary task.
It now becomes possible to directly identify Thornett’s key error of
assessment: “We have argued, throughout the crisis and confrontation in Greece,
that the situation posed by it raised the possibility of a workers’ government.”
That’s wrong, since “possibility” here clearly does not mean “extremely remote
possibility” but something closer to “tendency to push in the direction of.”
There was, in fact, no such tendency at work. There was only an extremely remote
possibility. Yet it is clear that Thornett pins all of his hopes on precisely
that most-unlikely turn of events:
Costas Lapavistas offers the same thought in another piece published by IV
as part of its collection
(http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4219), telling us that
Tsipras might have jumped the right way “when the real class issues were put on
the table.” (They weren’t on the table in January??!!) This possibility was
still in play, Lapavistas suggests, “until the week after the referendum.”
Perhaps. Such a development is certainly not excluded theoretically. But it
was, as just noted, extremely remote. And I cannot imagine the Comintern ever
proposing a policy that depended for its success on which way a particular head
of state might jump. No, I will be so bold as to assert that the Communist
International would have advocated an active policy to help push the
working-class movement itself to jump the right way, regardless of what any
particular leader chose to do. This, by itself, suggests that Lapavistas and
Thornett share a perspective that has little in common with that of the
Communist International in 1922.
A government with a reformist strategy doesn’t spontaneously transform
itself into a workers’ government of the type we are discussing—at least not
very often. Such a possibility is, therefore, not one we ought to expect or plan
for. It should have been clear from the outset that the Tsipras government was a
reformist government with a reformist strategy, and this realization should have
guided the orientation of revolutionaries—rather than a hope and a prayer that
events would somehow push Tsipras to suddenly become the class-struggle leader
he has never been.
Revolutionary goals: 1922 and today
As we have already noted, the Comintern’s theses were intended to prepare a
cadre for the necessary struggle within and with any government of this type
that might arise—in order to guarantee an actual transition to a genuine
proletarian state. The Third International was not attempting to develop a
strategy for the class struggle in the context of capitalist society. We can now
take our examination of this one step further, because the Communist
International in 1922 also understood that this transitional form could, in
fact, not be relied on to solve the immediate crisis of working-class
self-defense. In and by itself it was completely inadequate.
Here is what the Comintern theses have to say:
The reader should note two points in particular in this passage:
Thus we can see once again that the entire focus of the Communist
International in adopting these theses was “the question of state power,” of
creating a proletarian dictatorship. It was never how to advance the interests
of the working class and oppressed in the absence of any struggle to create a
proletarian state.
The Greek people should never have been dependent on which way Alexis
Tsipras, left to his own devices, decided to jump. The primary task was to
encourage the struggle itself to jump the right way—leaving Alexis Tsipras
behind if he refused to jump along with the mass movement. Like the Comintern in
1922, we, today, need to be focused on “the struggle for power” as something
that we are directly and immediately concerned with, even if the transition to
an actual proletarian state is not immediately on the agenda. That’s true both
because the question of creating a proletarian state is the primary concern of
the revolutionary movement, and because only a strategy that is focused on this
concern can, in fact, lead to the kind of fight-back we need today in order to
win concessions from the austerity-mongers, even within the context of bourgeois
society.
If we think about time in a political sense, the socialist revolution is
further off today than it was in 1922 when the Comintern considered this
question. That affects many things in terms of our tactics and strategy. But it
does not change the most fundamental thing: that a revolutionary policy must
have the goal of pursuing revolution, of bringing it closer by our actions today
even when we cannot make revolution today.
Thornett actually describes the kind of struggle that would have been
needed in Greece to bring revolution closer:
The point is, however, that this level of struggle does not happen, or at
least not very often, without a conscious effort by some political cadre with
sufficient critical mass and implantation in the class struggle to make it
happen. When the cadre sit back instead, waiting to see which way a particular
leader might jump, nothing is likely to happen.
Conclusion
I am not among those who believe that if the Communist International
suggested a certain course of action in 1922, we today must slavishly adhere to
that same course of action. I repeat: much has changed since 1922, both in the
world and in our understanding of it. But if we are going to cite the
perspectives of the Comintern to defend a particular policy we have an
obligation to be accurate in our assertions, and thorough in our understanding.
I could not agree more with Thornett’s conclusion:
But another debacle cannot be avoided by tinkering around the edges of a
policy that believes victory in a bourgeois election can lead to seizing control
of the government without “having to confront the question of state power just
yet.” Political formations like SYRIZA, or Podemos in Spain, or the British
Labor Party under Jeremy Corbyn, will only succeed if they break definitively
with trying to work out some favorable arrangement without directly challenging
the capitalist system, begin to engage, objectively even if not yet consciously,
in an immediate confrontation with the bourgeois state itself.
If a working-class party succeeds in gaining governmental power before the
capitalist state is overthrown, the only truly meaningful action it can take is
(in the words of Michael Lebowitz at
http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1149.php, discussing precisely this same
set of events) “to use its power as government . . . to support the development
of a new state from below.”
In the absence of that, all the rest is only wishful thinking.
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